An Examination of the Antidumping Provisions of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979: United States Implementation of the Antidumping Code Formulated in the Tokyo Round by Silverman, Alan H.
AN EXAMINATION OF THE ANTIDUMPING 
PROVISIONS OF THE TRADE AGREEMENTS ACT OF 
1979: UNITED STATES IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
ANTIDUMPING CODE FORMULATED IN THE TOKYO 
ROUND 
Alan H. Silverman* 
L INTRODUCTION 
Following the conclusion of the seventh series of multilateral 
trade negotiations (MTN) held under the auspices of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),1 the Tokyo Round was 
concluded in April, 1979.2 The U.S. Congress approved the negoti-
ated agreements and passed implementing legislation in the Trade 
Agreements Act of 1979.3 On January l, 1980, Title I of the Act, 
which contains the revisions to the antidumping and countervail-
ing duty provisions and expressly repeals the Antidumping Act of 
1921,4 became law. 
A unique, if constitutionally unforeseen, sequence was followed 
to enact the Trade Agreements Act of 1979. In the Kennedy 
Round of the MTN a decade ago, the administration formulated a 
code elaborating upon the sparse GATT language concerning anti-
dumping measures. Congress, however, was not receptive to the 
code. It had not been consulted prior to or during the negotiations 
and saw nothing useful in the final product. The result was Hill 
hostility toward the notion of a code and legislation that provided, 
in essence, that U.S. adherence to the code was acceptable only if 
no provisions of U.S. law were adversely affected by the document 
or by the work of the GATT Antidumping Committee. 
* B.A., Hamilton College (1976); J.D., M.B.A., University of Pennsylvania (1980). Cur-
rently an associate with the New York law firm of Hughes Hubbard & Reed. 
1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, done October 30, 1947, 61 Stat. (effec-
tive Jan. l, 1948) A3, T.l.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. For detailed discussion and analysis 
of GATT, see J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 35-57 (1969). 
2. For background on the Tokyo Round, see Wolff, The U.S. Mandate for Trade 
Negotiations, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 505 (1976). The text of the agreements was published in 
Message from the President of the United States, AGREEMENTS REACHED IN THE TOKYO 
ROUND OF THE MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, H.R. Doc. No. 153, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 
pt. 1 (1979) [hereinafter cited as MTA). 
3. Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (1979) (codified in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.) 
[hereinafter cited as Trade Agreements Act]. 
4. Id., Title I, § 106 (repealing 19 U .S.C. §§ 160-173 (1976)). 
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In enacting the Trade Reform Act of 197 4,5 Congress sought 
to avoid a repetition of this conflict. The Act specifically provided 
for continuous congressional consultation throughout the negotia-
tions of the Tokyo Round and, to avoid the debacle that followed 
the Kennedy Round,6 further provided for a novel legislative pro-
cedure under which the entire package negotiated in the MTN 
was either to be accepted in toto or rejected within a ninety-day 
period. No amendments could be offered in committee or on the 
floor. 7 
Congress did participate in the negotiations of the Tokyo 
Round. It was consulted in closed "mark-up" sessions of the rele-
vant congressional committees which engaged in the preparation 
of "statements of administrative action" designed to indicate the 
way in which the law would be implemented.8 The accompanying 
committee reports were negotiated and drafted together with ad-
ministration representatives. 
This article will examine the antidumping provisions of the 
Trade Agreements Act of 1979 as they reflect the MTN Anti-
dumping Code concluded in the Tokyo Round and will consider the 
potential impact of the new U.S. antidumping statute upon the 
trade of multinational corporations (MNCs) and less-developed-
countries (LDCs). 
IL ANT/DUMPING MEASURES-
UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES 
The economic theory of antidumping laws has been the sub-
ject of prior scholarly discussion.9 The classic definition of dump-
5. Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975) (codified in scattered sections of 5, 19 
U.S.C.). For a comprehensive, section by section analysis of the Act, see Campbell, The 
Foreign Trade Aspects of the Trade Act of 1974 (Part J), 33 WASH. & LEE L . REV. 325 (1976); 
Campbell, The Foreign Trade Aspects of the Trade Act of 1974 (Part JI), 33 WASH & LEE L. 
REV. 639 (1976). 
6. The Tokyo Declaration, as a result, made indirect reference to the need, based on . 
past experience, for assurances that the United States would implement its international 
commitments. Declaration of Ministers approved at Tokyo on 14 September 1973, paras. l, 4 
GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS (20th Supp.) 19, 21 (1974). 
7. 19 u.s.c. §§ 2112, 2191-94 (1976). 
8. TRADE AGREEMENTS ACT OF 1979 STATEMENTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, H.R. 
Doc. No. 96-153, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2 (1979) [hereinafter cited as STATEMENTS OF AD-
MINISTRATIVE ACTION]. 
9. See Note, Dumping by State-Controlled-Economy Countries: The Polish Golf 
Cart Case and the New Treasury Regulations, 128 U. PA. L . REV. 217, 221 (1979). See 
generally, MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD., ANTIDUMPING LAW: POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION 
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ing is "price discrimination between national markets."10 Dumping 
is perceived to occur when a foreign producer sells his goods in an 
export target market at prices lower than those of the same goods 
sold in the home market.11 From a theoretical, economic viewpoint, 
dumping is not evil per se. If a continuous flow of less expensive 
goods were guaranteed, no harm would result because injury to 
the target market's domestic industry would be offset by the 
benefit of a constant supply of inexpensive goods.12 However, if 
the foreign producer raises the prices of his goods to artificially 
high and noncompetitive levels once the target market's domestic 
competition has been eliminated or substantially curtailed, the 
long range injury to competition in the target market outweighs 
the temporary benefit of lower prices. 
According to the theoretical proponents of international free 
trade policy, unfettered international competition will maximize 
efficiency and result in lower prices as each nation comes to 
specialize in producing those products for which it is best suited.13 
On the other hand, "predatory" dumping to capture a share of a 
target market by undercutting domestic competitors is viewed as 
inimicable to "free trade" and as constituting an unfair trade prac-
tice against which nations espousing free trade principles may 
legitimately defend their domestic industry. In keeping with the 
policy of international free trade, all imports that undersell 
domestic goods are not held to be subject to dumping sanctions. 
Only those imports that undersell domestic goods by exploiting an 
artificial or anticompetitive advantage are subject to sanctions.14 
(1979); Ehrenhaft, Protection Against International Price Discrimination, 58 CoLUM. L. 
REV. 44 (1958). 
10. J. VINER, DUMPING: A PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 3 (1923). 
11. See Barcelo, Antidumping Laws as Barriers to Trade-The United States and 
the International Dumping Code, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 491, 494 (1972). 
12. Id.; see Anthony, The American Response to Dumping from Capitalist and 
Socialist Economics-Substantive Premises, and Restructured Procedures After the 1967 
GATT Code, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 159, 163-77 (1969). 
13. Id. See also P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 668-91 (10th ed. 1976); Coudert, The Appli-
cation of the United States Antidumping Law in the Light of a Liberal Trade Policy, 65 
COLUM. L. REV. 189 (1965). 
14. In theory, a foreign manufacturer could dump his goods in the United States even 
though he sold them at prices equal to or higher than his domestic competitors. Dumping 
that does not undersell prices charged by domestic competitors is labeled "technical dump-
ing" and does not result in a finding of injury. See Vinyl Clad Fence Fabric from Canada, 40 
Fed. Reg. 51, 243, 244-45 (1975) (concurring statement of reasons of Comm'rs Moore and 
Ablondi). 
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However, price discriminatory exports are presumed exploitative 
on the assumption that lower export prices are subsidized by 
higher prices elsewhere and thus do not reflect the "fair value" of 
the goods.15 
This presumption underlies the Trade Agreements Act. The 
premise of the antidumping law is that if a foreign producer sells 
goods at a given price in his home market, he ought not to sell for 
less in the United States if the effect of such sales is to injure .U.S. 
producers of like merchandise.16 At the root of the implementation 
of the Act is the notion that U.S. producers of goods that are com-
petitive with imports are entitled to government-imposed protec-
tion against "unfair" foreign competition and predatory pricing 
practices.11 In keepiiig with the traditional concept of price 
discrimination, the Trade Agreements Act focuses entirely on the 
difference in prices charged by the individual foreign producer in 
its domestic and foreign markets.18 The element of predation 
which was absent in the Antidumping Act of 1921 is lacking in the 
Trade Agreements Act as well.19 
It is noteworthy that dumping does not exist merely because 
a foreign producer undersells domestic competition. On the other 
hand, dumping is not avoided where the foreign producer meets 
the price charged in his target market. The U.S. antidumping law 
limits examination to the difference in prices charged by the pro-
ducer in his home market and in the U.S. market. The fact that the 
producer lacks competition in his home market and may, because 
of this or for other reasons, be able to command higher prices 
15. The fair value of goods is normally understood as cost plus profit. See Feller, The 
Antidumping Act and the Future of East-West Trade, 66 MICH. L. REV. 115, 118 (1967). 
16. See H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1979) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 
REP. No. 317]. 
17. Id. at 43, 44. 
18. Id. at 44-45. 
19. The Antidumping Act of 1916, 15 U.S.C. §§ 71-77 (1976), does require "intent to 
injure" as an element of both its criminal and civil offenses, but the problem of proving such 
intent has rendered that statute a virtual dead letter, and it has never been successfully in-
voked. Hiscocks, International Price Discrimination: The Discovery of the Predatory 
Dumping Act of 1916, 11 INT'L LAW. 227, 232 (1977). Moreover, potential complainants are 
loathe to initiate such proceedings because antitrust counterclaims that are burdensome to 
defend and may result in liability are common. See Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 474 F. 
Supp. 168, 179 (D. Del. 1979) (held that the Polish golf cart manufacturer and its domestic 
distributor's counterclaim alleging a conspiracy to submit knowingly false information to the 
Treasury Department and the U.S. Customs Service, resulting in assessment of dumping 
duties, was sufficient to state a claim under section 1 of the Sherman Act against former 
domestic manufacturer). 
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there than in the United States, is irrelevant and provides no 
defense to a charge of price discrimination.20 Rather, it can be 
argued that the higher priced home market sales which enable the 
foreign producer to offer the lower priced goods that injure com-
petitors in the United States are thus precisely the "evil" against 
which the law is aimed. If the foreign producer were to lower his 
home market price to the same level as that charged in the U.S., it 
could not afford to "dump."21 It is similarly irrelevant that foreign 
producers, like their American counterparts, occasionally sell at a 
loss to preserve investments or meet fixed costs or because their 
product is affected by natural forces such as the maturation cycle 
of agricultural produce. 
/IL THE ANT/DUMPING CODE FORMULATED 
IN THE TOKYO ROUND 
The code on antidumping negotiated during the Tokyo 
Round22 requires that antidumping proceedings be brought "by or 
on behalf' of a domestic industry. The code recognizes that anti-
dumping practices should "not constitute an unjustifiable impedi-
ment to international trade" and that antidumping duties "may be 
applied only ... [where] dumping causes or threatens material in-
jury to an established industry or materially retards the establish-
ment of an industry" and furthermore calls for "equitable and 
open procedures in the examination of dumping cases" and for the 
"speedy, effective and equitable resolution" of dumping disputes.23 
The MTN Antidumping Agreement, in its provisions concern-
ing the determination of injury, provides that the determination of 
an injurious impact on a domestic industry should include evalua-
tion of "all relevant economic factors and indices that have a bear-
20. Ehrenhaft, What the A ntidumping and Countervailing Duty Provisions of the 
Trade Agreements Act [Can] [Will] [Should] Mean for U.S. Trade Policy, 11 LAW & POL'Y 
INT'L Bus. 1361, 1363 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Antidumping and Trade Policy]. 
21. See Ehrenhaft, Protection Against International Price Discrimination: United 
States Countervailing and Antidumping Duties," 58 COLUM. L. REV. 44, 49 (1958). 
22. International Antidumping Code, done June 30, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 4348, T.I.A.S. No. 
6431 (effective July l, 1968); MTN, Antidumping: Agreement on Implementation of Article 
VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade MTN/NTM/W/232, done April 9, 1979, 
!hereinafter cited as Antidumping Agreement], reprinted in MTA, supra note 2, at 311-37. 
23. Id., reprinted in MT A, supra note 2, at 312. The antidumping code also calls for 
contracting parties to take into account "the particular trade development and financial 
nt>t•ds of developing countries" and recommends the establishment of alternative, construc-
t ivt• remedies where LDC's are involved in dumping cases. Id. 
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ing on the state of the industry," including actual and potential 
decline in output, sales, market share, profits, productivity, return 
on investments or utilization of capacity as well as factors affect-
ing domestic prices such as actual and potential negative effects 
on cash flow, inventories, employment, wages, growth, and ability 
to raise capital or investments.24 The Agreement calls for a deter-
mination that injury to domestic industry is caused by the dumped 
imports and not by other factors which are not attributable to im-
ported merchandise.25 Thus, the Agreement calls for a finding that 
(a) dumping has occurred; (b) material injury or retardation has oc-
curred; and (c) a direct causal link between the dumped imports 
and the alleged injury can be established. 
One participant in the recent MTN has observed that, on the 
national level, the ultimate success of the Tokyo Round will de-
pend upon "the willingness of governments to resist domestic pro-
tectionist pressures and [the reestablishment of] a basis for 
responding to worldwide economic problems with negotiation 
rather than 'beggar your neighbor' mercantilism."26 An analysis of 
the U.S. Trade Agreements Act reveals the extent to which pro-
tectionist sentiment continues to outweigh the principles of free 
trade. 
IV. ANALYSIS OF KEY SECTIONS OF THE 
ANT/DUMPING PROVISIONS OF THE TRADE 
AGREEMENTS ACT OF 1979 
The Trade Agreements Act abolished the Antidumping Act 
of 192127 and replaced it with a new antidumping statute which 
was enacted in the form of amendments to the Tariff Act of 1930.28 
24. Antidumping Agreement, supra note 22, pt. I, art. 3, para. 3, reprinted in MT A, 
supra note 2, at 315. 
25. Id. pt. I, art. 3, para. 4, reprinted in MT A, supra note 2, at 315. 
26. Graham, Reforming the International Trading System: The Tokyo Round Trade 
Negotiations in the Final State, 12 CORNELL INT'L L.J. l, 3 (1979). See also Graham, Results 
of the Tokyo Round, 9 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 153 (1979). 
27. 19 U.S.C. § 160-171. The Antidumping Act of 1921 was originally directed toward 
the elimination of international price discrimination practiced at the time by large European 
cartels. Its purpose was to protect U.S. industry from the dumping of goods at less than cost 
or home value. It provided for the imposition of dumping duties on imports sold in the U.S. 
market at "less than fair value," if, as a result of such imports, a U.S. industry was "being or 
likely to be injured, or [was] prevented from being established." See Victor, United States 
Antidumping Rules, 10 ST. MARY'S L. J. 217 (1978). 
28. Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1202-1654 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 
Tariff Act of 1930]. 
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The new statute encompasses the transfer of authority to regulate 
antidumping duties from the Treasury Department and the U.S. 
Customs Service to the International Trade Administration of the 
Department of Commerce29 and provides both substantive and pro-
cedural changes to U.S. antidumping law. These changes will like-
ly have a significant impact on trade involving the United States 
and other countries, LDC's and multinational corporations. It may 
be criticized as providing too many concessions to domestic in-
dustries which may seek the imposition of protectionist trade bar-
riers. 
Under the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, dumping occurs 
when a foreign producer exports and sells goods in the United 
States at less than fair value.30 If such sales are taking place and 
are causing or threatening to cause material injury31 to an in-
dustry in the United States, or if the sales are materially retard-
ing the establishment of a domestic industry, then an antidumping 
duty is added with the aim of bringing the United States sales 
price of the foreign goods into line with the fair value of the mer-
chandise. 32 
Under the terms of the new legislation, an antidumping duty 
will be imposed whenever the administering authority determines 
"that a class or kind of foreign merchandise is being sold or is like-
ly to be sold in the U.S. at less than its fair value" and the Interna-
tional Trade Commission determines that an industry in the 
United States is "materially injured, or is threatened with 
material injury, or the establishment of an industry in the U.S. is 
materially retarded."33 Ordinarily, the amount of the duty to be im-
posed is "an amount equal to the amount by which the foreign 
market value exceeds the United States price34 for the merchan-
dise."35 
29. The International Trade Administration published its regulations concerning an-
tidumping duties in 45 Fed. Reg. 8,182-8,208 (February 6, 1980) (codified in 19 C.F.R. § 353 et 
seq.). 
30. Trade Agreements Act, supra note 3, § 731 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673). 
31. Id. The requirement that the injury be "material" is a major innovation of the 
1979 Act. See H.R. REP. No. 317, supra note 16, at 45-49. 
32. See Trade Agreements Act, supra note 3, at§ 731 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673). 
33. Id. 
34. The Trade Agreements Act adopts a new term "United States Price" which 
incorporates the previous concepts of "purchase price" and "exporter's sales price" under 
the Antidumping Act of 1921 but does not change their meaning. Id. at§ 772 (codified at 19 
U.S.C. § 1677a). 
35. Id. at§ 731 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673). 
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The principal substantive change in the Act is the substitu-
tion of "material injury" for "injury" as the standard by which the 
International Trade Commission determines whether less than 
fair value imports have injured domestic industry. Under the 
prior law the requisite showing of injury did not require materi-
ality.36 This new standard may require a slightly higher level of in-
jury to be shown than was the case under the Antidumping Act of 
1921.37 
Notably, the Trade Agreements Act, in its definition of "in-
jury," fails to assess domestic conditions of competition or levels 
of prices, technology, adaptation to changing demand or other 
factors which may injure domestic industry38 and rests upon the 
concept of "overall" injury. It does not require that dumping be 
the principal or even major cause of injury but permits a finding of 
injury upon the barest causal link. The Act does not require that 
the complainant or its industry as a whole be operated efficiently 
and does not expose the complainant to counterclaims for its own 
possible violation of trade regulation laws.39 It further fails to re-
quire "clean hands" in determining whether relief should be 
withheld because the domestic industry is also dumping in foreign 
countries.4° Finally, under the Act domestic producers may occa-
36. "Material injury" is defined as "harm which is not inconsequential, immaterial or 
unimportant." Id. at § 771(7) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)). 
37. But see the SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE REPORT ON THE TRADE AGREEMENTS ACT, 
S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 87-89 (1979) [hereinafter cited as S. REP No. 249), indi-
cating that Congress does not expect the inclusion of the term "material" to significantly 
alter the decisions of the International Trade Commission from previous practice: "[T]he 
ITC determinations with respect to the injury criterion under existing law ... have been, on 
the whole, consistent with the material injury criterion of this bill." Id. at 87. 
38. The MTN code on antidumping provides that administrators of antidumping laws 
consider "other factors" that may cause injury. Antidumping Agreement, supra note 22, pt. 
I, at 3, para. 3, reprinted in MTA, supra note 2, at 315. However, the House Report does 
recommend consideration of other factors. H.R. REP. No. 317, supra note 16, at 47. The 
original draft of the ITC's proposed regulations under the Trade Agreements Act did not 
mention other factors, 44 Fed. Reg. 59392, 59404 (1979) (proposed regulation 19 C.F.R. § 
207.26). However, after intense criticism, the ITC's final rules on injury did include a 
reference to "other factors" that the Commission "will also take into account." 44 Fed. Reg. 
76,458, 76,473 (1979) (codified at 19 C.F.R. § 207.27). 
39. The Act provides no immunity against antitrust claims. Under the Noerr-Penning-
ton doctrine, however, the mere invocation of legal procedures against competitors may be 
protected by the First Amendment, Eastern R.R. President Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, 
Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 136-40 (1961); United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 
657, 669-70 (1965), unless the proceedings constitute a "sham" used to harass competition, 
California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 515-16 (1972). 
40. Ehrenhaft, Antidumping and Trade Policy, supra note 20, at 1378 (footnotes 
omitted). 
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sionally sell portions of their output below cost while, at the same 
time, claiming that similar selling techniques by foreign exporters 
constitute dumping. Thus, a domestic industry may be suffering 
injury from a variety of factors, but so long as dumped imports is 
one of them, the ITC can make an affirmative injury determina-
tion. 
Additionally, the Trade Agreements Act now permits, in the 
absence of sales in the home market, the use of constructed value 
(based on costs of production) in the determination of home market 
value,'1 even where third-country export price information is 
available. Under the old law the Treasury Department, in the 
absence of sales in the home market, could not use constructed 
value unless it first determined that there was insufficient infor-
mation to determine a third-country export price.'2 
The principal procedural changes in the antidumping law em-
bodied in the Trade Agreements Act relate to shortened time 
periods during the investigative phase of proceedings,43 detailed 
provisions concerning the suspension of investigations," the im-
position of time limits on the liquidation of entries subject to the 
assessment of antidumping duties,'5 yearly administrative review 
of outstanding suspension agreements and antidumping duty 
orders,'6 and judicial review of interlocutory and final decisions.'7 
While the accelerated time periods contained in the Act may be 
praised as providing for the "prompt administration of justice," 
serious questions may be proffered as to precisely how just such 
provisions are. It has been posited that the accelerated time frame 
within which antidumping investigations are to be completed and 
the expansion of judicial review of both interlocutory and final 
decisions provided in the Act were prompted by protectionist 
sentiment,'8 for Congress adopted these reforms without any 
41. Trade Agreements Act § 773(e) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e)). 
42. Although the Trade Agreements Act provides the administering authority with 
the discretion to use constructed value as it deems appropriate it is not likely to alter the 
existing preference for third-country export value over constructed value. Remarks of Noel 
Hemmendinger, District of Columbia Bar, Continuing Legal Education Program on the 
Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Feb. 5, 1980. 
43. Trade Agreements Act, supra note 3, at §§ 732-733 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 
1673a-1673b ). 
44. Id., at§ 734 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1671c). 
45. Id., at§§ 735-40 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673d-1673i). 
46. Id., at § 751 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1675). 
47. Id., at§§ 1001, 516A (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1516a). 
48. Ehrenhaft, Antidumping and Trade Policy, supra note 20, at 1381. 
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study of the impact of the existing antidumping laws and adminis-
trative procedures or of whether accelerated (and perhaps more 
arbitrary) decision-making would provide any meaningful im-
provement. 49 
The Act provides that the Commerce Department may initi-
ate an investigation whenever it determines that an investigation 
is warranted, or that an investigation must be initiated within 20 
days50 after an "interested party"51 files a petition on behalf of a 
domestic industry.52 While the Trade Agreements Act reflects the 
MTN antidumping code requirement that antidumping pro· 
ceedings be brought "by or on behalf of the industry ,"53 the Act 
arguably goes further in defining the classes of potential com-
plainants by giving standing to labor unions to file complaints and 
participate in proceedings.54 This furtherance may result in signif-
icantly increased filings. 
49. However, a report published by the General Accounting Office in 1979 found 
seven cases in the 17 cases it studied where exporters accelerated shipments when an anti-
dumping proceeding was initiated in order to "beat" the subsequent withholding of 
appraisement notice. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, U.S. ADMINISTRATION OF THE ANTI-
DUMPING ACT OF 1921: REPORT TO THE CONGRESS BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL 9-10 (1979) 
[hereinafter cited as GAO Report]. To address the problem of increased shipments pending 
withholding of appraisement, the Trade Agreements Act now contains provisions for the 
retroactive application of dumping duties when such "critical circumstances" are 
demonstrated. Trade Agreements Act, supra note 3, at § 703(e) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 
1671b(e)). 
50. This represents a reduction of 10 days from the old initiation period. 
51. "Interested party" includes domestic manufacturers, producers or wholesalers of 
a like product, labor unions or other groups of workers representative of an industry 
engaged in the manufacture, production or wholesale sale of a like product and trade or 
business associations, the majority of whose members manufacture, produce or wholesale a 
like product in the United States. Trade Agreements Act, supra note 3, § 771(9) (codified at 
19 U.S.C. § 1677(9)). The Act also encourages governmental assistance to potential com-
plainants in the filing of petitions. The administering authority has the responsibility "to 
advise and to assist private parties, as appropriate, before they file the petition." S. REP. 
No. 249, supra note 37, at 63. 
52. Trade Agreements Act, supra note 3, at § 732(b)(l) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 
1673a(b)(l)). 
53. Antidumping Agreement, pt. I, art. 5, para. 1, reprinted in MT A, supra note 22, at 
317. The Trade Agreements Act provides: "An antidumping proceeding shall be commenced 
whenever an interested party . . . files a petition with the administering authority, on behalf 
of an industry, which alleges the elements necessary for the imposition of the duty . . . "Id. 
at § 732(b)(l) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(b)(l)). 
54. Under the Trade Agreements Act, "producers" includes labor and "interested· 
parties" includes unions, a majority of whose members manufacture, produce or wholesale a 
product "like" the ones imported. Id. at§§ 702(b), 771(9)(0) (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671a(b), 
1677(9)(D)). See also H.R. REP. No. 317, supra note 16, at 50. 
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Within 45 days of the filing of any petition or of initiation, the 
ITC must reach a determination as to whether there is a "reason-
able indication" that a U.S. industry is threatened with or is being 
materially injured or has been materially retarded by reason of 
imported merchandise.55 Thus, unlike prior law, the ITC will now 
make a determination in every case. Since the standard for a pre-
liminary affirmative decision is low, it is likely that few cases will 
be terminated on the basis of the ITC's initial review. 
The Act contains shortened time periods to insure that in-
vestigations are completed as quickly as possible.56 Antidumping 
proceedings are generally to be concluded within 300 days, ap-
proximately 100 days more quickly than under the Antidumping 
Act of 1921. Moreover, the 3-to 31/z-year delay between the entry 
of goods subject to a finding and an assessment of dumping duties 
was harshly criticized by the congressional committees which 
directed that all assessments be concluded within a period pref-
erably as short as six months but in no event longer than two 
years after entry.57 The charts contained in the Appendix contrast 
the time periods under the Antidumping Act of 1921 and the 
Trade Agreements Act of 1979. 
The new, shortened time limits concerning antidumping in-
vestigations impose substantial burdens on submission by im-
porters and foreign manufacturers. If such submissions are not 
made in a timely manner, a decision will be made on the basis of 
the best information available, including the information supplied 
by the domestic complainant. Thus, while a domestic industry or 
interested party may file an antidumping action at any time which 
it determines is propitious, the importer or foreign producer has a 
short time in which to respond and will likely be adversely af-
fected if it does not respond within the allotted time. 
As under the Antidumping Act of 1921, whenever the ad-
ministering authority makes a affirmative determination of less-
than-fair-value (LTFV) sales, liquidation must be suspended for all 
55. Trade Agreements Act, supra note 3, at§ 703(a) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1671b(a)). 
This provision differs from 19 U.S.C. § 160(c)(2) of the Antidumping Act of 1921 where the 
ITC made a preliminary determination only where the Treasury Department referred the 
matter in cases where a "substantial doubt" of injury existed. 
56. Id. at§§ 732-733 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673a-1673b). 
57. Id. at§ 736(a) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673(a)). See H.R. REP. No. 317, supra note 
16, at 69; S. REP. No. 249, supra note 37, at 66. 
11
Silverman: Antidumping Provisions
Published by SURFACE, 1980
250 Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 7:239 
entries of merchandise subject to the determination.58 Under the 
new provisions, however, a cash deposit may be required in lieu of 
a bond.59 The statute also provides for retroactive withholding of 
appraisement in "critical circumstances" where the Commerce 
Department determines that there is a history of dumping in the 
U.S. or the importer knew or should have known that the exporter 
was selling at LTFV and, in addition, massive imports of merchan-
dise subject to the investigation had taken place over a relatively 
short period of time.60 
Once a preliminary determination is made by the Commerce 
Department, and absent the suspension or termination of an in-
vestigation, 81 it is forwarded to the International Trade Com-
mission for a material injury determination.82 Upon an affirmative 
ITC finding of material injury and the issuance of a dumping 
order, dumping duties may be imposed.83 Under previous practice 
entries were to be liquidated within one year subject to adminis-
trative extensions,84 however, final assessments were frequently 
not imposed until years after a final dumping order. The Trade 
Agreements Act provides formal time limits for assessments85 and 
requires the payment of the entire amount of the estimated dump-
58. Trade Agreements Act, supra note 3, §§ 736-738 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 
1673e-1673g). If the preliminary determination is negative, security is not required to be 
posted until and unless there is a final determination of LTFV sales. 
59. Id. Under the Antidumping Act of 1921, when liquidation was suspended the 
importer was required to post a bond in an amount determined by the Secretary of 
Treasury. 
60. Id. at§ 733(e) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(e)). 
61. The Commerce Department may suspend an investigation on the acceptance of an 
agreement by exporters accounting for "substantially all" of the goods under consideration 
whereby they agree to eliminate all LTFV sales or cease exports to the U.S. entirely or to 
eliminate completely the injurious effects of the imports upon the relevant U.S. industry. 
Trade Agreements Act, supra note 3, at § 734 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673c). The term 
"substantially all," according to the Congressional Committee Reports, refers to exporters 
responsible for no less than 85 percent of the total volume of merchandise subject to the in-
vestigation in the most recent representative period. H.R. No. 317, supra note 16, at 64; S. 
REP. No. 249, supra note 32, at 71; see also Statement of Administrative Action, supra note 
8, at 31. 
62. Trade Agreements Act, supra note 3, at§ 732(d) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(d)). 
63. Id. at§§ 736-738 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673e-1673g). 
64. Tariff Act of 1930, supra note 28, at § 504 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1504). 
65. Duties must be assessed with 6 months after "satisfactory" information upon 
which an assessment may be based has been received, but in no event later than 12 months 
after the manufacturer's accounting period within which the merchandise entered or no 
later than 12 months after the manufacturer's or exporter's accounting period within which 
merchandise is sold to someone other than the exporter. Trade Agreements Act, supra note 
3, at§ 736 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673e). 
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ing duty on entry based upon the LTFV margin found in the final 
dumping order.66 These provisions will likely shorten the time 
frame and significantly increase the amount of money required to 
be paid as duties. 
The Act significantly expands the requirements for adminis-
trative and judicial review of determinations by the Commerce 
Department and the International Trade Commission.67 In terms of 
administrative review, the new law provides for a yearly review 
of the suspension of investigation agreements as well as of the 
amount of a dumping duty which thereby causes a redetermi-
nation of the foreign market value and the United States price of 
each entry subject to an order and the amount by which the 
foreign market value exceeds the price.68 These periodic reviews 
are designed to insure that the amount of dumping duties imposed 
will reflect current dumping margins. Further, upon the assertion 
of "changed circumstances," an interested party may request 
Commerce Department review of an affirmative final determi-
nation of LTFV sales, a determination to suspend an investigation 
pursuant to an exporter's agreement, an ITC determination of 
material injury or retardation, or an ITC determination that a 
suspension agreement eliminated the injurious effects of imports 
upon domestic industry.69 
The judicial review provisons contained in the Trade Agree-
66. Id. at§§ 736-738 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673e-167Sg). This provision permits the 
temporary posting of a bond for up to 90 days after publication of the final order during 
which time the importer must provide information on which to determine the duty. At the 
end of the 90-day period, or as soon as a basis for the duty has been determined, estimated 
duties must be paid in full. It is interesting to note that the E.E.C. antidumping rules 
provide that an antidumping duty may be less than the LTFV margin if such lesser duty 
would be adequate to remedy the injury. O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 93) (1968); O.J. EuR. COMM. 
(Spec. Ed.) (1968), as amended by O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 160) (1977), However the U.S. law 
requires a duty equivalent to the margin irrespective of its adequacy to remedy the injury. 
67. Trade Agreements Act, supra note 3, at §§ 751, 516A (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 
1675, 1516a). 
68. The extent of both the margins involved and of compliance are subject to review. 
The Commerce Department may order reinstitution of an investigation if it is dissatisfied 
with the extent of compliance. Id. at§ 751(a) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)). 
69. Id. at§ 751(b) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1675(b)). However, a Commerce Department 
review of an affirmative final determination of LTFV sales or suspension of an investigation 
pursuant to an agreement, or ITC review of its material injury determination or of a 
suspension agreement, may not occur until 24 months have elapsed since the publication of 
the determination of suspension, absent "good cause" for an early review. H.R. REP. No. 
317, 1vpra note 16, at 72. 
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ments Act provide increased rights of review of both final and 
interlocutory determinations made in the course of an antidump-
ing investigation.70 Most of the rights of review are, however, 
accorded exclusively to the domestic industry, and exporters are 
accorded more limited rights to appeal decisions which affect them 
adversely. The Act permits an interested party to go to the U.S. 
Customs Court for interlocutory review of legal conclusions or 
underlying factual findings concerning a Commerce Department 
determination that a case is extraordinarily complicated and that 
the time limits for the investigation must be extended, a 
preliminary determination that no LTFV margins exist, a deter-
mination by either the ITC or Commerce Department not to 
review a prior determination or suspension agreement upon an 
assertion of "changed circumstances," or an ITC determination 
that an industry is not being material injured, threatened with 
material injury or materially retarded.71 Review of final deter-
minations by the ITC on material injury or by the Commerce 
Department on LTFV are judicially reviewable72 as under the An-
tidumping Act of 1921. 78 
The review process embodied in the Trade Agreements Act 
may be criticized as unfair to importers and foreign producers. 
The Act provides that if an initial decision is reached by the Com-
merce Department adverse to an importer or foreign producer, it 
cannot be appealed until the end of the proceeding. However, if a 
preliminary determination is made that no dumping has occurred, 
the domestic complainant can immediately appeal to the Customs 
Court. It may be argued that there is no incentive for an exporter 
to appeal since there is no reason to appeal a decision not to initi-
ate an investigation. Further, an appeal prior to a final determi-
nation would be costly and would provide serious time delays. 
Notwithstanding these concerns, the review provisions do operate 
to the advantage of domestic industry complainants who seek the 
imposition of dumping duties. 
70. The applicable standard of review is whether such determinations were "unsup-
ported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 
Trade Agreements Act, supra note 3, §§ 516A(a)(l), (2), (b)(l)(B) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 
1516a(a)(l), (2), (b)(l)(B)). 
71. Id. at§ 771(a) (codified at 19 U.S.C. 1677 (a)). "Interested party" includes unions, 
trade or business associations and the government of the exporting country. 
72. Id. at lOOla(a)(l), (2), (b)(l)(B) (codified at 19 U.S.C. 1516a(a)(l), (b)(l)(B)). 
73. Id. The periodic review by the Commerce Department of LTFV sales or of suspen-
sion agreements may be judicially reviewed as well. 
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V. POTENTIAL IMPACT ON THE OPERATIONS OF 
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 
Numerous corporations which were formerly considered 
"American" have established international strategic approaches 
to ascertain the least expensive inputs and best markets for their 
products. As a result of increased global integration, occasions 
have arisen where separate operations of a single multinational 
corporate entity were positioned on opposite sides of an anti-
dumping controversy .74 For examples, potash from Canada was 
produced by the same MNC's that owned facilities in the U.S. 
which were allegedly injured by the dumping of the Canadian pro-
duct, 75 and Ford automobiles manufactured in Europe have been 
the subject of a U.S. antidumping investigation.76 
The Trade Agreements Act has significantly altered the 
treatment of dumping controversies where multinational corpora-
tions are involved. The Antidumping Act of 1921 assumed the ex-
istence of separate "home" or "third" country and domestic 
markets in which price levels could be independently deter-
mined.77 While the assumption was valid in many cases where 
necessary isolation of markets and freedom to set prices occurred, 
this assumption failed in its application to the operation ·of 
MNC's78 where independent markets are blurred and may be re-
garded as part of a worldwide market. 79 The Antidumping Act of 
74. Ehrenhaft, Multinational Enterprises and the Antidumping Law, 20 HARV. INT'L 
L. J. 277 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Ehrenhaft, Multinational Enterprises]. 
75. Potassium Chloride from Canada, 34 Fed. Reg. 19,003 (1969) (Determination of 
Sales at Less Than Fair Value); 34 Fed. Reg. 13,670 (1969) (Tariff Commission Determination 
of Injury and Likelihood of Injury). 
76. Automobiles from West Germany, 41 Fed. Reg. 34,989 (1976) (Discontinuance of 
Antidumping Investigation). 
77. The price in the domestic United States market of imported merchandise was called 
the "purchase price" and was defined as "the price at which such merchandise has been 
purchased or agreed to be purchased, prior to the time of exportation, by the person by 
whom or for whose account the merchandise is imported." 19 U.S.C. § 162(a) (1976). The 
price in foreign markets was called the "foreign market value" and was defined as 
the price, at the time of exportation of such merchandise to the United States, at 
which such or similar merchandise is sold or, in the absence of sales, offered for 
sale in the principal markets of the country from which exported, .... or, .... the 
price at which so sold or offered for sale for exportation to countries other than 
the United States. 
19 U.S.C. § 164(a) (1976). 
78. Ehrenhaft, Multinational Enterprises, supra note 74, at 280-81. 
79. In the course of an antidumping proceeding, the Treasury was required to deter-
mine whether merchandise was being, or was likely to be, sold in the United States at less 
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1921 presumed that a foreign producer did not have an affiliated 
U.S. reseller80 and failed to address intracorporate transfer pricing 
at less than arm's length.81 The law required that investigation 
and computation be based on the price charged in the first sale by 
the MNC's U.S. seller to an unrelated party. From that price all of 
the company's costs, extending backward to include the pro-
ducer's presumed "foreign export price," were deducted prior to 
comparison with the home-market price of the foreign producer.82 
The Trade Reform Act of 197 4 did consider the application of the 
antidumping law to MNC's, particularly where MNC's use overall 
company profits as "subsidies" to offset unfairly low prices in the 
United States.83 However, its attempt to address the issue was 
never invoked.84 As a result, in subtracting the U.S. related 
than its fair value. 19 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976). This less than fair value determination increas-
ingly took the form of a mathematical price comparison test: the United States selling price 
compared to an approximation of foreign market value of the merchandise under investiga-
tion. Note, Treasury Runs the Maze: Less Than Fair Value Determinations Under the Anti-
dumping Act of 1921, 8 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 919, 922 (1978); see 19 U.S.C. § 161(a) (1976). 
80. This is a particularly acute problem. A report of the United Nations Centre on 
Transnational Corporations notes that 46% of total U.S. imports and 45% of total U.S. ex-
ports have been "intra-firm." Transnational Corporations in World Development: a Re-
examination, 4 U.N. Doc. E./C. 10/38, 43 (1978). 
81. In determining the United States selling price of the merchandise under investiga-
tion, the Treasury used either the purchase price or the exporter's sales price of the mer~ 
chandise. When a foreign producer had an affiliated United States reseller, the relevant 
price for comparison purposes was the exporter's sales price, defined as "the price at which 
such merchandise is sold or agreed to be sold in the United States, before or after the time 
of importation, by or for the account of the exporter," with certain adjustments. 19 U.S.C. § 
163 (1976) (emphasis added). 
82. Id. 
83. See SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, TRADE REFORM ACT OF 1974, s. REP. No. 1298, 
93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 174-77 (1974). 
84. The Trade Reform Act of 1974 added a new section 205(d) which provided that if 
an MNC had production and sale facilities in two or more foreign countries, only one of 
which supplied the U.S. market, then the home market price of the entity actually supplying 
the U.S. was to be disregarded if another related entity supplied non-U.S. markets with the 
same goods at higher prices than those at which such merchandise was sold to the United 
States. 19 U.S.C. § 164(d) (1976); see Ehrenhaft, Multinational Enterprises, supra note 74, at 
281. However, this section is triggered only if MNC sales in the home exporting country are 
non-existent or too few to provide an adequate basis for price comparison with U.S. sales 
and ignores the possibility that a MNC could subsidize both sales to the U.S. and home 
market, thereby allowing sufficient home market sales to force the use of the normal foreign 
market procedure. Thus, the subsidized price of the home market sales would be low, so 
that if the foreign market value were compared to the United States sales price, no dump-
ing determination would result, enabling the MNC to succeed at underselling American 
competition while avoiding the assessment of a dumping duty. See Note, Treasury Runs 
The Maze: Less Than Fair Value Determinations Under the Antidumping Act of 1921, 
supra note 79, at 937. 
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party's selling expenses from its resale prices in order to reach 
the figure to be compared with the foreign market value of the 
goods, no allowance was made for the reseller's profits. 85 The re-
lated party thus held an advantage over unrelated sales agencies 
which must earn a profit to survive. 
The Trade Agreements Act does address, though imperfectly, 
the operations of MNC's. Section 773(d) of the Act provides that 
where merchandise exported to the U.S. is produced by a multi-
national corporation and where sales of such or similar goods do1 
not exist or are inadequate as a basis for comparison of U.S. sales 
with those in the country of exportation, and where, in addition, 
the foreign market value outside the country of exportation is 
greater than the value within the exporting country, the applied 
value shall be the foreign market value at the time of exportation 
of such goods sold in substantial quantities in other countries. 
Such calculation will involve adjustments for differences in the 
costs of production, including taxes, labor, materials and over-
head, where such differences are satisfactorily demonstrated as 
well as the costs of packaging and shipping.86 Although this provi-
sion is an improvement over prior law, it still fails to encompass 
situations involving "intra-firm" sales and may well fail in prac-
tice. 
The Act fails to address the situation where MNC's with di-
versified production and distribution facilities acquire components 
of products from another country at less than fair value prices 
which are then assembled for sale to the U.S. The products might 
later be sold at uniformly low prices in both the home market of 
their assembly and the United States. Further, U.S. multinational 
corporations will likely be unwilling to invoke the antidumping 
provisions of the Trade Agreements Act either because they do 
not feel that the pressure of import competition can be mean-
ingfully addressed through the antidumping proceedings or 
because they fear retaliation against their export sales.87 Thus, in 
85. A deduction was required to be made in computing exporter's sales price only for 
the amount of the commissions, if any, for selling in the United States the par-
ticular merchandise under consideration, by an amount equal to the expenses, if 
any, generally incurred by or for the account of the exporter in the United States 
in selling identical or substantially identical merchandise. 
19 U.S.C. § 163 (1976) (emphasis added). 
86. Trade Agreements Act, supra note 3, at§ 773(d) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(d)). 
87. Ehrenhaft, Antidumping and Trade Policy, supra note 20, at 1376. However, as 
the author notes, steel and chemical companies are exceptions. 
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substance and in terms of enforceability, the new provision may 
inadequately address abuses or price-discriminatory strategies 
practiced by multinational corporations. 
VL POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES FOR 
LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
The "Tokyo Declaration," which gave the Tokyo Round its 
name and established its terms of reference, called for "im-
provements in the international framework for the conduct of 
world trade"88 and recognized the need to adopt "differential 
measures" in order to give developing countries "special and more 
favorable treatment ... in areas of the negotiation where this is 
feasible and appropriate."89 This principle encompasses a rule of 
"graduation" to permit LDC's to take on increased responsibilities 
under GA TT as their levels of development advance. It also 
reflects the qualified success of LDC's in convincing the inter-
national community to permit some forms of special treatment for 
their exports.90 However, these calls by LDC's for easier access to 
developed country markets have largely gone unheeded.91 
The bargaining power of developing countries was weakened 
in the recently completed Tokyo Round by their strong, con-
tinuous opposition to the principle of reciprocity92 and their later 
demand for a departure from the most-favored-nation (MFN) 
clause,93 which are the cornerstones of GATT, to make possible 
the introduction of a one-way preferential system for LDC's.94 The 
MTN Antidumping Agreement did recognize, however, that 
88. Declaration of Ministers, supra note 6, at 22. 
89. Id. at 21. Graham, Reforming the International Trading System: The Tokyo 
Round Trade Negotiations in The Final Stage, 12 CORNELL INT'L L.J. l, 27-28 (1979). 
90. One result of this effort was the adoption of the Generalized System of 
Preferences, which allows selected exports from LDC's to enter the markets of developed 
countries at lower duty rates than those applied to the same products from developed coun-
tries. See Graham, The U.S. Generalized System of Preferences for Developing Countries: 
International Innovation and the Art of the Possible, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 513 (1978). 
91. See YEATS, TRADE BARRIERS FACING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1979); Nowzad, Dif-
ferential Trade Treatment for LDC's, FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT (1978) at 16. 
92. Reciprocity is essentially the principle of "give and take" which implies mutuality 
of gains and the granting of equivalent concessions. 
93. The MFN clause contained in Article II of the GA TT is a principle of non-
discrimination and calls for the automatic and unconditional extension of concessions to all 
other contracting parties. See BISD, supra note 6, at 2. 
94. A thorough discussion of this debate is contained in Ibrahim, Developing Coun-
tries and the Tokyo Round, 12 J. WORLD TRADE L. l, 3 (1978). 
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special attention must be given by developed countries to the 
situation of developing countries when considering the application 
of antidumping measures. That Agreement called for the explora-
tion of possible "constructive" remedies before applying anti-
dumping duties where the duties would effect the essential in-
terests of LDC's.95 Despite this MTN recommendation, however, 
the Trade Agreements Act contains no such flexibility in the pro-
vision of "constructive" remedies and treats dumping by LDC's in 
a manner similar to dumping by developed countries. Thus, the 
development goals of LDC's are extraneous to U.S. antidumping 
decisions inasmuch as LDC's would be subject to automatic rem-
edies if a dumping determination were made. 
Developing countries have long recognized the importance of 
market access for their exports to developed countries. LDC's con-
cern for their future development has grown with the increased 
incidence of protection in developed market economies and with 
the realization that trade barriers often impact disproportionately 
on products exported by developing countries.96 LDC's have ex-
pressed particular concern over protection, such as antidumping 
measures, granted in response to claims that their exports are 
disrupting domestic markets. Two important concerns have been 
raised by the developing countries. First, while they view 
safeguard action as both necessary and appropriate in many cir-
cumstances, they seek some guarantee that such action will be 
temporary in nature and will take into consideration the disrup-
tion in their own economies and markets that follows the imposi-
tion of dumping duties or other protectionist measures. Second, 
LDC's want it to be clearly and factually established that develop-
ing country imports are responsible for the "material injury" 
suffered by a domestic industry prior to the imposition of any pro-
tectionist response.97 
LDC's are justifiably concerned about antidumping measures 
such as those contained in the Trade Agreements Act. If they are 
unable to sell their products in the United States, alternative 
95. Antidumping Agreement, supra note 22, at pt. I, art. 13, reprinted in MT A, supra 
note 2, at 325. See generally, MTN, Differential and More Favorable Treatment, Reciproci-
ty and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries, MTN/FR/W/20/Rev. 2 (1979), reprinted 
in MT A at 622-61. 
96. Sampson, Contemporary Protectionism and Exports of Developing Countries, 8 
WORLD DEVELOPMENT 113 (1980). 
97. Id. at 116-17. 
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outlets must be sought. This is frequently an arduous undertak-
ing. LDC's have argued that their exports are frequently used as 
scapegoats to mask internal structural problems in the country of 
importation. One commentator has observed that import growth 
has not significantly affected the growth of output or employment 
in the United States.98 In the field of textiles, an industry frequently 
the subject of dumping investigations or voluntary restraint 
agreements, recent studies have revealed that imports of textiles 
from developing countries accounted for less than 2.50/o of U.S. 
consumption and less than 100/o of the consumption of clothing in 
1975. Moreover, developing countries are net importers of the 
intermediate goods and raw materials for the manufacture of 
clothing and .other textile goods.99 
LDC's have posited that protectionist measures, such as the 
imposition of dumping duties, employed against developing coun-
tries are ill-chosen because the exports of manufactured goods 
from developed countries to developing nations have increased 
substantially more than their imports from LDC's. Moreover, 
LDC's argue that the loss of jobs in import-competing industries is 
not due to increased imports but is the result of the ; failure of 
developed countries to keep pace with technological innovation 
and the diffusion of production technology and ability .100 It is 
argued that protectionism will reduce pressures for productivity 
and cost-efficiency improvements in import-competing industries. 
National incomes will subsequently decline because resources will 
not be used to the best advantage and potential economies of scale 
will not be realized.101 
The increasing employment of state trading by developing 
countries to improve their bargaining power, expand exports, 
provide central planning, raise revenue for the government, diver-
sify the geographical and commodity structure of exports, and 
lower costs may increase exposure to the risk of a dumping find-
98. Krueger, Effects of Exports from New Industrial Countries on U.S. Industries, in 
GROWTH, TRADE AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN AN OPEN AUSTRALIAN ECONOMY 15 (W. Kasper 
& T. Perry, eds. 1978). 
99. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, HANDBOOK OF INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT STATISTICS (1979). 
100. See Franko, Multinationals: The End of U.S. Dominance, 56 HARV. Bus. REV. 95 
(1978). 
101. Balassa, World Trade and the International Economy: Trends, Prospects and 
Policies, WORLD BANK STAFF WORKING PAPER No. 282 at 33-35 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 
Balassa]. 
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ing.102 As a result, such risk may induce LDC producers to limit ex-
ports to the United States for fear of financial loss in the form of 
payments of additional duties or bonds which may strain the 
LDC's treasury .103 Thus, LDC sales of products at less than fair 
value to capture market share will likely be curtailed. It may be 
argued that LDC's will be acutely disadvantaged because market 
forces as well as the benefits obtained by shifts to lower-cost 
sources will be foregone, thereby freezing existing patterns, 
discriminating against new producers, and obstructing potential 
changes in comparative trade advantage.10' 
VIL CONCLUSION 
The principle objectives of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) are the progressive reduction of barriers to 
trade and· the diversion of trade flows according to the free trade 
principle. Its goal is to increase the economic welfare of its con-
tracting parties.105 The Trade Agreements Act is an attempt to 
codify such principles. While imperfect, its failings cannot be attri-
buted to American protectionism alone but must be viewed as a 
reflection of worldwide protectionist sentiment.106 
The purposes of the antidumping provisions of the Trade 
Agreements Act are to discourage price discrimination practices 
and the sale of unfairly priced import goods in the United States, 
and to off er remedies for the injury suffered by domestic industry 
when such practices occur. It is, in essence, intended to be pre-
ventive and not punitive. Nevertheless the Act, which in both 
design and application will present undue hardships to foreign 
producers and developing countries, fails to adequately address 
the global operations of multinational corporations and is suscepti-
ble to protectionist designs. 
The Act places greater restrictions on the practices of foreign 
producers selling in the U.S. market than are applied to domestic 
102. See Kostecki, State Trading in Ind'U8trialized and Developing Countries, 12 J. 
WORLD TRADE L. 187, 188 (1978). 
103. See Balassa, supra note 101, at 15; Balassa, The 'New Protectionism' and the 
International Economy, 12 J. WORLD TRADE L. 409, 418 (1978). 
104. Id at 425. 
105. See generally, K. DAM, THE GATT-LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
ORGANIZATION (1970). 
106. See Jackson, The Crumbling Institutions of the Liberal Trading System, 12 J. 
WORLD TRADE L. 93 (1978), for an insightful analysis of the causes of crisis in the interna-
tional liberal trade system and in the effectiveness of GA TT. 
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producers. U.S. producers are not likely to suffer governmentally 
imposed financial burdens if they sell at less than full cost as long 
as they do not sell below average variable cost.107 Further, the Act 
fails to adequately distinguish between dumping by inadvertence 
or as the result of rational business decisions to introduce new 
products, test new markets, or reduce surplus or outdated inven-
tories, and intentional, predatory dumping to eliminate competi-
tion in order to gain market control. Moreover, it ignores the par-
ticular needs of LDC's whereby sales practices are fostered by 
government policies aimed at maintaining employment levels, ob-
taining foreign exchange needed to finance internal development, 
or to help alleviate chronic balance-of-payment deficits. 
Finally, due to the difficulty of ascertaining a foreign market 
price for imported goods, the danger exists that the new anti-
dumping provisions will be undermined by protectionist ends. One 
result may be that domestic industries which are overly concen-
trated and inefficient or sell at inflated prices will be shielded 
from the healthy competition provided by lower priced imports. 
The Code promulgated in the Tokyo Round and the Trade 
Agreements Act are steps in the right direction. Further steps 
are required, however, if the ideal of free trade is ever to be 
achieved. 
107. See Chillicothe Sand & Gravel Co. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 615 F.2d 427 (7th Cir. 
1980) (no predatory pricing or Sherman Act violation where defendant's prices were above 
average variable cost). 
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VIII. APPENDIX 
CHART 1 
ANTIDUMPING INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURE-ANTIDUMPING ACT OF 1921 
CUSTOMS TREASURY ITC TIMEFRAMES 
I OFFICE OF TARIFF I CASE FILED AFFAIRS REVIEW OF I PETITION(note a) 
l 30 D \YS 
-
TECHNICAL BRANCH, I NOTICE OF INITIATION I DUTY ASSESSMENT 
DIVISION : I OF INVESTIGATION 
r INVESTIGATION 
I 
OFFICE OF 
INVESTIGATION 
OVERSEAS 
INVESTIGATION & 
VERIFICATION 
RECOMMENDATION I REVIEW OF CUSTOMS I 
TO CUSTOMS I DECISION BY OFFICE OF 
COMMISSIONER TARIFF AFFAIRS, 
l 6 TO 9 MONTHS I TENTATIVE DECISION: I SALES AT LTFV; GENERAL COUNSEL 
l 
WITHOLDING OF I NOTICE OF WITH OLDING I APPRAISEMENT I OF APPRAISEMENT (DISTRICT DIRECTORS) 
I 
l 
I 
PRESENTATION OF 
I VIEWS ON LTFV DETERMINATION 
l 3 MONTHS 
I FINAL LTFV I I INJURY I DETERMINATION INVESTIGATION 
I (GENERAL COUNSEL, I I (OFFICE OF I SECRETARY) INVESTIGATION) 
l l 3 MONTHS DETERMINATION I I I DETERMINATION I OF FINAL MARGIN FINDING OF DUMPING OF INJURY AND PREPARATION I I I (COMMISSIONERS) OF MASTERLISTS 
3 TO 31/1 
ASSESSMENT/ 
YE1RS COLLECTION 
OF DUTIES 
a BY AMENDMENT IN THE TRADE ACT OF 1974, TREASURY AT THIS STAGE COULD REQUEST A PRELIMI· 
NARY INDICATION OF INJURY DECISION FROM THE ITC. 
SOURCE: COMPTROLLER GENERAL, U.S. ADMINISTRATION OF THE ANTIDUMPING ACT OF 1921, 
REPORT TO CONGRESS 3 (G.A.0. 1979). 
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CHART2 
ANTIDUMPTING CASES 
(Statutory Deadlines)-TRADE AGREEMENTS ACT OF 1979 
DAY 1-PETITION FILED WITH THE ADMINISTERING AUTHORITY AND THE 
ITC 
(If self-initiated by Administering Authority no action required on day 20) 
DAY 20-INITIATION DECISION BY THE ADMINISTERING AUTHORITY 
(The ITC is informed. If the decision is negative, the case is terminated.) 
DAY 45-REASONABLE INDICATION OF INJURY DETERMINATION BY THE ITC 
(If the decision is negative the case is terminated) 
DAY PRELIMINARY DETERMINATION 
OF SLFV 
FINAL AFFIRMATIVE DETER· 
MINATION OF SLFV 
ITC INJURY 
DETERMINATION 
(If negative, case terminated) 
--------Day 185-------------Day 230 
AFFIRMA TIVEb 
·--------Day 245-------------Day 290 
(if exporters request an extension) 
fA~110 (if verification waived) 
--------•Day 185'-------------Day 260 
NEGATIVE ________ ..,Day 245'-------------Day 320 
(if petitioner requests an extension) 
.~-------..... Day~5---------------Day280 
AFFIRMATIV ~-------..... Day 295 ---------------Day 340 
(if exporters request an extension) 
for 8~160 (normal case) 
 ----------Day~''------------- Day310 
NEGATIVE·---------Day 295•·------------- Day 370 
(if petitioner requests an extension) 
--------Day 285-------------•Day 330 
AFFIRMATIVE·-------~ ~ Day 345-------------..,Day 390 
~ (if exporter requests an extension) 
for C)-!10 (extraordinarily complicated case or at petitioner's request) 
~ ·---------Day 285''--------------- Day 360 
NEGATIVE---------Day 345''--------------- Day 420 
(if petitioner requests an extension) 
b. LIQUIDATION SUSPENDED. 
Source: Ehrenhaft, What the A ntid:umping and Countervailing Duty Provisions of the Trade 
Agreements Act {Can] {Will] {Should] Mean for U.S. Trade Policy, 11 LAW & POL'Y INT'L 
Bus. 1361, 1370-71 (1979) 
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